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 The Precautionary Principle Revisited: 
Its Interpretations and their Conservation Consequences 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The precautionary principle was included in 1992 in the Rio Declaration on 
Environmental and Development and is a part of important international agreements 
and documents, for example, the Convention on Biological Diversity. Yet the 
interpretation of this principle is not straightforward as a guide for environmental 
policy – a variety of interpretations are possible. This paper identifies and examines 
various economic versions of the principle. Furthermore, it shows that different 
economic versions of the principle can give rise to conflicting policy 
recommendations for resource conservation. In addition, it demonstrates that 
applications of the principle do not always favour (natural) resource conservation (for 
example, biodiversity conservation) although the main support for it politically has 
been on the assumption it does. The principle’s potential consequences for 
biodiversity conservation of the introduction of new genetic material, such as 
genetically modified organisms are explored. 
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 The Precautionary Principle Revisited: 
Its Interpretations and their Conservation Consequences 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, the adoption of the precautionary principle has been strongly 
advocated as a guide to appropriate environmental policy. In 1992, it was 
incorporated in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. A flow-on 
consequence of this has been its inclusion in many international agreements and 
protocols affecting environmental conservation. In this article, it is argued that it is 
misleading to speak of the precautionary principle. This definite term disguises the 
fact that many different rules or principles can be put forward in advocating 
precaution. Depending upon what particular rules or measures for exercising 
precaution are proposed, very different policy consequences can follow. For example, 
the principle may or may not favour the conservation of natural resources. Although 
the principle has been strongly supported by conservationists, it only favours the 
conservation of natural resources and existing biodiversity in particular cases.  
The article begins by highlighting the way in which the precautionary principle has 
been incorporated in international agreements, declarations, conventions, and 
protocols of significance for environmental conservation. Various interpretations and 
applications of ‘the’ precautionary principle found in the relevant literature are 
identified, put in context and critically assessed. Subsequently, it is shown how 
different interpretations of the precautionary principle can lead to conflicting policy 
recommendations as far as the conservation of existing biodiversity is concerned. 
Then a simple model is introduced to analyse the implications of the introduction of 
new GMOs and human developed genotypes for the desirability of conserving their 
existing genetic substitutes. This provides new insights into the rationality of 
conserving existing genotypes as a precautionary measure. 
2. The Incorporation of the Precautionary Principle in International 
Declarations, Conventions and Protocols. 
In 1992, the precautionary principle was included as a guiding principle for 
environmental policy formulation in the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
1 
 Development and it has been almost routinely included in subsequent international 
agreements affecting environmental conservation. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 
states:  
 “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.” 
Close examination of Principle 15 reveals that it lacks precision and only provides a 
very weak guide to environmental policy choices. The nature of the precautionary 
approach itself is not spelt out. Secondly, although it is said that this approach should 
be widely applied by States, how widely is not specified. While it is mentioned that 
the principle should be applied when there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage to the environment, no mention is made of how the seriousness of the threat 
should be determined. For example, how is the social economic loss that might be 
occasioned by this damage to be assessed? In addition, the scope for reversibility of 
damages is not always dichotomous (that is reversible or not reversible) because 
partial reversibility is achievable in some circumstances and the extent to which 
reversibility can be realized is often time-related. Therefore, the ‘in-between cases’ 
involving reversibility are ignored. 
The lack of specification of social objectives also constitutes a problem for the 
application of this principle because these are relevant to deciding whether possible 
environmental damages are serious or not. Again, a dichotomous view is adopted in 
Principle 15 about the seriousness of environmental damage: the possible damage is 
either regarded as serious or not serious (there are no degrees of seriousness) and it is 
indeterminate as to who will decide whether the damage is serious and how they will 
decide this. Will this seriousness be decided for example by natural scientists or a 
select group of these, and what social values ought to be taken into account in 
determining seriousness?  
Just how large the threat should be before preventative action to avoid environmental 
degradation is required is unclear and the term ‘environmental degradation’ is 
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 imprecise. For example, environmental changes regarded by some individuals as 
causing degradation may be regarded by others as resulting in environmental 
improvements. It is also debatable whether society would want to avoid all 
irreversible environmental degradation because human benefits from some such 
changes far exceed the costs of the environmental loss. 
One extreme interpretation of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration is that it requires 
precautionary measures to be taken whenever there is any threat of irreversible 
environmental degradation. This has been called the strong precautionary principle. A 
weaker version is that such measures need only be taken if there is creditable evidence 
that an irreversible threat exists. Judgment is, however, required to decide whether the 
evidence is creditable and room exists for disagreement. How likely are the threats 
and how serious they might be is often a bone of contention. Even the theory of 
logical probabilities, as for example proposed by Keynes (1921), is unable to resolve 
such matters. 
Principle 15 states that the precautionary measures should be cost-effective. One 
interpretation of this is that these ought to be measures that involve the least cost of 
avoiding serious environmental damage. However, in some legal interpretations of the 
principle, the proportionality rule has been invoked, namely that the cost of measures 
to avert environmental degradation should be proportionate to [balanced against] the 
benefits to be attained (see Anon, 2009 and reference to Telstra Corporation Ltd v 
Hornsby Shire Council, a case decided by Justice C.J. Preston in the New South 
Wales Land and Environment Court as well as Mohr and Tyrrell, 2006). This appears 
to entail some rudimentary cost-benefit analysis. 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) incorporates 
the precautionary principle in article 3.3. This states: 
“The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking 
into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be 
cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To 
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 achieve this, such policies and measures should take into account different 
socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks 
and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic 
sectors. Efforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by 
interested Parties.” 
This is basically the same statement as in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. It does 
not identify what global benefits are to count and how they will be quantified. It 
mentions cost-effectiveness but it avoids any mention of income distribution issues 
which are bound to arise in trying to implement cost-effective measures to limit global 
warming (see for example, Tisdell 2009a, Ch. 11). 
The preamble to the Convention in Biological Diversity (1992) notes ‘that it is vital to 
anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of a significant reduction or loss of biological 
diversity at its source” and “that when there is a threat of significant reduction or loss 
of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason 
for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat”. These observations 
leave open the question of what constitutes a significant reduction or loss in 
biodiversity (how is that to be determined?) and there is no definite guide about how 
society should act when there is lack of scientific agreement. The negative statement 
that lack of full scientific certainty is not a sufficient reason for failing to adopt 
precautionary measures is very imprecise. 
The Cartegena Protocol (2000) has been developed pursuant to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. Its purpose is “to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of 
protection in the field of the safe [international] transfer, handling and use of living 
modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse 
effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking into 
account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary 
movements.” This protocol specifically reaffirms in Article 1 the precautionary 
approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. The Protocol contains 
guidelines for risk management and assessment (Article 15 and Annex III 
respectively) in cases where transboundary movement of living modified organisms is 
under consideration. Adequate risk assessment and measures to ensure it are seen as 
an important part of the Cartagena Protocol. However, the provisions only signal 
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 general intent and consequently, allow for considerable latitude in their application. 
Nevertheless, these provisions are an important step forward in applying 
precautionary principles to environmental policy because they ensure some attention 
to the need for precautions in the international transfer of living modified organisms. 
The precautionary approach also forms part of several other international agreements 
affecting environmental policies, and the principle has been adopted by the European 
Commission as a guide for the EU’s environmental policies. However, many of the 
ascribed meanings and interpretations of the precautionary principle found in the 
literature go well beyond those that can reasonably be inferred from official 
agreements and international conventions. The principle has become, in many cases, a 
springboard for favouring particular ethical position supporting environmental 
conservation or for pre-empting its potential implications. For instance, consider one 
set of interpretations provided by GDRC (undated). This set is based on a paper by 
Professor Elizabeth Wilson presented at a conference held in Japan in 1997. 
3. Varied Interpretations of the Precautionary Principle and the Choice of 
Precautionary Measures based on Standard Use of Terms. 
1.1. Seemingly positive interpretations of the precautionary principle that are 
imprecise and not value-free 
A mixture of normative and positive interpretations of the implications of the 
normative principle has resulted in considerable confusion. For example, examining 
the interpretations identified by the GDRC (undated), only two interpretations appear 
to be of a positive nature. These are:  
(1) precaution or preventative anticipation interpreted as “readiness to take 
action in advance of [full] scientific proof where inaction may be socially or 
environmentally costly”, and 
(2) futurity which is interpreted as the “recognition that the future is uncertain; but 
that it needs to be given due weight”. 
Whether or not the second interpretation is purely positive depends upon how the term 
‘due weight’ is interpreted, but an important element of the precautionary principle is 
that future events are to a significant extent influenced by present actions. Even in the 
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 first case deciding whether inaction is socially or environmentally costly requires 
value judgements. 
1.2. Interpretations that are explicitly value-laden 
Additional implications ascribed to the precautionary principle are more problematic. 
For example, value judgments are added. These include the view that environmental 
costs be a part of cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analyses and include “a 
presumption in favour of high environmental quality” [emphasis added by me]. 
While in social cost-benefit analysis it is important to take environmental costs into 
account, a presumption in favour of high environmental quality involves a value-bias. 
A further value-bias is apparent in the interpretation of the precautionary principle 
which claims that the environment should be awarded “intrinsic value”. The ethical 
and normative nature of ‘intrinsic value’ is explored, for example, by Gatzweiler and 
Volkmann (2007). 
1.3. Some claims about the policy implications of the precautionary principle 
need qualification 
Two other interpretations identified by Wilson are claimed to be implications of 
adopting rational precaution. However, they may not always be rational. These are 
that it implies the “safeguarding ecological space: leaving wide margins of tolerance 
in environmental capacities” is desirable and that “shifting the onus of proof: 
imposing a duty of care on those who intend to develop the environment” is a rational 
precaution. The former rule is relatively open because it does not specify the width of 
the margins but it may give some support to the use of safe minimum environmental 
standards. This claimed implication of this principle seems to implicitly include 
assumptions about how much risk should be accepted socially. Thus, apart from its 
imprecision, a value-assumption could underlie this interpretation. In addition, not all 
safe minimum standards are rational as can be inferred from my consideration of 
Bishop (1978) in the next section. 
The onus of proof argument is often combined with the view that those who 
implement environmental or other changes in the availability of commodities should 
be strictly liable legally for any damages that consequently occur, or that they should 
be liable if they have not taken sufficient care. Judgment is then required about what 
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 constitutes adequate proof or sufficient care. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions and 
for some types of change, the exercise of care does not rule out strict legal liability, 
although it may reduce the amount of damages payable (Tisdell, 1993, Ch. 5). These 
legal strictures all create transaction costs that militate against change, and their 
application in a blanket-manner is likely to be irrational. 
1.4. It is important to consider standard meanings of the words ‘precaution’ 
and ‘precautionary’ 
Given that the precautionary principle has been laden with so many value judgements 
and dubious implications, it seems constructive to return to fundamental analysis of 
the economic value of exercising precaution in making decisions about resource-use. 
To do this, I will first consider the standard English meaning of the words 
‘precaution’ and ‘precautionary’ and then consider analytically the value of adopting 
precautionary measures for the conservation of natural resources, particularly existing 
biodiversity. 
According to The Macquarie Dictionary (Delbridge, 1991) ‘precaution’ is “1. a 
measure taken beforehand to ward off possible evil or ensure good results. 2. caution 
employed, beforehand; prudent foresight” and ‘precautionary’ means “1. pertaining to, 
or of the nature of precaution, or a precaution. 2. expressing or advising precaution.” 
Thus, it can be inferred that the use of the terms ‘precaution’ and ‘precautionary’ has 
at least three implications: 
(1) the adoption of measures (beforehand) that reduce the likelihood or costliness 
of unwanted results or outcomes; 
(2) the exercise of prudent foresight; and 
(3) possible advice to adopt a cautious approach to decision-making. 
From this, it is clear that in order to discuss the rationality of deciding to adopt 
precautionary measures, it is necessary to know what the objective of the decision-
maker is. Secondly, one needs to determine how much foresight is prudent (or indeed 
possible) bearing in mind the collection and processing of information about the 
future has costs and some aspects of the future may be unknowable. In other words, 
bounded rationality needs to be taken into account. Third, advising the adoption of a 
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 cautious approach can, amongst other things, imply that a risk-averse attitude towards 
decisions should be adopted and consequently, this may alter the relevant criterion for 
decision-making under uncertainty. In turn, this can be expected to change the type of 
precautionary measures that it is rational to adopt. Hence, the rational choice of 
precautionary measures depends upon: 
(1) the objective being pursued; 
(2) to what extent it is prudent (or even possible) to gain foresight; and 
(3) attitudes towards the bearing of risk or uncertainty.  
This will be illustrated for several choice problems involving the conservation of 
genotypes. A related intellectual issue requiring more consideration is identification of 
what possible measures can be regarded as precautionary. 
4. The Precautionary Principle in Economics and its Application to the 
Conservation of Natural Resources, especially Biodiversity Conservation. 
4.1. Views of economists about precaution and environmental conservation 
Introduction of the precautionary principle in economics is usually attributed to Arrow 
and Fisher (1974). They showed that even when the relevant objective is to maximize 
expected net social benefits and if uncertainty exists about the possible future value of 
irreplaceable natural resources, conservation of such resources may raise expected 
gains. In other words, rational precaution tends to favour the conservation of 
irreplaceable (or difficult to replace) natural resources. 
Prior to Arrow and Fisher (1974), Tisdell (1970) introduced the principle in a paper 
written in 1970 developed from his previous research (Tisdell, 1968, Chs. 5,6 and 7). 
This paper made it clear that the principle had relevance to a wide range of economic 
policies and identified circumstances in which precautionary measures are rational 
and other circumstances in which they prove to be irrational, given that the objective 
is to maximize expected net benefits. The scope for learning and the future ability to 
take advantage of new information or improved knowledge were found to be of 
central importance for decisions about what types of precautionary measures are 
rational given that expected net benefits are to be maximized. 
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 While these theoretical developments provided new insights into the optimal choice of 
economic policies, Robert Bishop (1978) building on the legacy of Ciriacy-Wantrup 
(1968), questioned the relevance of using expected social cost-benefit analysis to 
guide conservation policies, particularly the conservation of species. Two basic issues 
were raised: 
(1) there is fundamental or irreducible uncertainties about the future value of any 
species; and 
(2) compared to that typically displayed in the application of expected net benefit 
analysis, greater risk-aversion is desirable. 
4.2. Risk-aversion need not favour nature conservation 
This led Bishop (1978) to recommend (with some qualifications) the adoption of the 
maximin gain approach (or the equivalent of a minimax loss approach) based on the 
use of game theory as a basis for determining the conservation of species. The 
maximin gain criterion puts heavy stress on the avoidance of possible losses and 
places a high value on the security of net benefits. When combined with the 
assumption of Ciriacy-Wantrup (1968) that the cost of conserving individual species 
at a safe minimum population is low relative to the possible benefits from their 
conservation, it favours the conservation of species. However, the costs of saving 
some species relative to their possible benefits can be high because they need a very 
large natural area which has a high opportunity cost if conserved. For example, this 
may be so in the case of the orangutan in Borneo (see, for example, Tisdell and 
Swarna Nantha 2008, pp. 240-241 and references given there). Furthermore, there are 
also difficulties in determining what is a safe minimum population; while increasing 
the size of the population of most species adds to their chances of survival, it does not 
ensure this (Hohl and Tisdell, 1993). Again, if resources for the conservation of 
species are limited, the safe minimum population approach cannot give an adequate 
guide to which species should be saved given that all cannot be conserved, that is it 
fails to solve the Noah’s Ark problem (Tisdell, 1990). 
It is generally believed that the conservation of existing species is a sound 
precautionary strategy. However, application of the maximin gain criterion often 
favours development at the expense of the conservation of individual species. For 
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 instance, consider the example given in the matrix shown in Table 1. This is a simple 
case in which the decision-maker has a dichotomous choice of strategies and in which 
there are only two possible states of nature. For the human decision-maker, strategy α1 
is to adopt measures to conserve the focal species and strategy α2 is to opt for 
development that causes the extinction of this species. There are also two possible 
states of nature: if s1 occurs the species is found to have a high value in the future but 
if s2 occurs the species is found to have little value in the future. The benefits from 
economic development are believed to be relatively certain. The values in the body of 
the matrix shown in Table 1 represent the possible payoffs from this game against 
nature. 
Table 1:  A hypothetical game against nature in which the optimal maximin 
strategy is not to conserve a species. 
  Species of high 
future value 
Species of little 
future value 
 
  s1 s2  
Conserve α1 16 2 2 
Develop 
(do not conserve) 
α2 10 10 10* 
 
Given the matrix in Table 1, the minimax gain strategy (identified by an asterisk) is 
not to conserve the species. This would be so even if the payoff from development 
was only just a little more than 2. In fact, less risk-averse criteria are more favourable 
to the conservation of the species. For example, application of the maximax criterion 
in this case favours the conservation of the species as does the expected gain criterion 
if the estimated probability of s1 is high enough. To some extent, it is surprising that 
the expected gain criterion is more favourable to the conservation of the species than 
the minimax gain criterion. Nevertheless, this result seems quite consistent with the 
adage that “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush”. 
4.3. Minimax regret as a criterion for environmental conservation 
In some cases, the minimax regret criterion favours the conservation of a species 
when the minimax gain criterion does not. However, in the example given in Table 1, 
it does not. As can be seen from the regret matrix corresponding to the matrix in Table 
1 shown in Table 2, the minimax regret strategy in α2, that is development. On the 
other hand, if the entry in the top right-hand corner of the matrix in Table 1 is changed 
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 to 5 for example, the minimax regret strategy becomes α1 whereas the minimax gain 
strategy continues to be α2. In practice, it seems unlikely that individuals would only 
consider the value of opportunities forgone and ignore the actual level of benefits that 
they might obtain when different strategies are adopted. 
Table 2: The regret matrix corresponding to the matrix in Table 1. In this case, 
the minimax regret criterion is unfavourable also to the conservation 
of the species but sometimes it is favourable to this when the minimax 
gain criterion is not. 
  Species of high 
future value 
Species of little 
future value 
 
  s1 s2  
Conserve α1 0 8 8 
Develop 
(do not conserve) 
α2 6 0 6* 
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that whether or not conservation of a species is a 
rational precaution depends upon attitudes to risk-aversion and the nature of the 
objective being pursued. Furthermore, increased risk-aversion is not always 
favourable to the conservation of existing species. 
4.4. Risk-aversion is likely to favour strategies to reduce the rate of global 
warming 
On the other hand, risk-aversion is likely to favour adoption of measures to reduce the 
severity of global warming, such as reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. This is 
because the possible economic costs of not acting are very high. This problem has a 
game-like structure similar to that shown by the matrix in Table 3. In this case, two 
alternative states of nature are possible: s1, continuing emissions of greenhouse gas as 
usual does not result in a major economic problem, and s2, it does result in a major 
economic problem. Two alternative strategies are considered: α1, moderate 
greenhouse gas emission and α2, continue ‘business as usual’. Given the benefits 
indicated in the body of the matrix, the minimax gain strategy is to moderate 
greenhouse gas emissions. Even the expected gain criterion will support the choice of 
this strategy in this case if a major economic loss from ‘business as usual’ strategy is 
more likely than a minor loss. 
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 Table 3: Risk-aversion is likely to favour precautionary measures to reduce 
the rate of global warming and this strategy may be desirable even if 
risk neutrality prevails. 
  Economic cost 
of GHG 
emission is low 
Economic cost 
of GHG 
emission is high 
 
  s1 s2  
Moderate GHG emission α1 6 6 6* 
Do not moderate GHG 
emissions 
α2 8 4 4 
 
5. Further Considerations of the Wisdom of Keeping Options Open by 
Conserving Existing Genotypes – Challenges Posed by GMOs and Other 
Human Developed Genotypes 
5.1. Caution is needed in comparing optimal biodiversity conservation with the 
stocking of libraries 
Following the publication of several papers by Weitzman (1992, 1993, 1998), it has 
become common amongst economists specializing in biodiversity economics to liken 
the problem of optimizing the conservation of biodiversity to that of stocking a library. 
This is done for example, by Goeschl and Swanson (2007) and Di Falco and Chavas 
(2007). They conceptualize genetic diversity as if it is informational diversity. Such 
information has current economic value and potential but imperfectly known future 
value. Taking such matters into account, the problem is to design an optimal library or 
by analogy, an optimal set of biodiversity. They conclude that taking into account 
progress in economic theory examining such issues, a greater number of genotypes 
and greater diversity of these should be conserved to satisfy future options for use 
than current conditions would imply (Goeschl and Swanson; 2007, p.290). In other 
words, this would be a rational precautionary measure. The theories which they 
review rely primarily for their results or expected values of net benefits. This means 
that uncertainties are not fully accounted for so the practical implications of their 
conclusion are qualitative. There is not yet a concrete rule to determine which 
genotypes should be conserved and how many this should be. It is also not clear that 
maximizing expected net social benefits ought to be the guiding rule – it assumes risk 
neutrality. 
A further issue is the extent to which libraries are in fact managed or can be managed 
in accordance with the proposed general rules claimed also to be valuable in 
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 determining the conservation of biodiversity.  To what extent, for instance, library 
collections should be replicated. The failure of libraries to follow similar management 
rules to those proposed for biodiversity conservation may have lessons for the social 
management of biodiversity conservation itself. In practice, many libraries may not be 
managed in a co-ordinated manner. 
Furthermore, libraries are not just the repositories of factual information but many 
hold fictional material designed purely to entertain. By analogy, the economic value 
of some species resides in their curiosity and observational value to humans, which, as 
suggested by Bishop (1978), may alter with the passage of time. In addition, 
individual valuations are influenced by social values which can alter as time moves on 
(see, for example, Tisdell et al., 2006). In such circumstances, values are path-
dependent and are not completely endogenous to individuals, as was stressed by 
Veblen (1934) and Myrdal (1958). 
5.2. The optimality of conserving existing substitute genotypes for new human 
produced genotypes 
Kassar and Lassere (2004) show for a special case that even when two species are 
perfect or very close substitutes and their future evolutionary paths are uncertain, 
conserving both may be rational and is more likely to be optimal the greater in the 
uncertainty about their future evolutionary paths. They assume that the goal is to 
maximize expected net benefits. This result accords with earlier findings about the 
value of retaining flexibility or keeping options open (Tisdell, 1970). Kassar and 
Lassere are able to generalise their special case so that it applies to multiple species 
but continue to assume that their evolutionary paths accord with a particular stochastic 
pattern. 
Although Kassar and Lassere (2004) introduce dynamics into their analysis, 
traditional economic analysis of the value of conserving biodiversity seems to be 
based fundamentally on a static conception of biodiversity. For example, it usually 
assumes that in the period requiring human attention or assessment, that the stock of 
biodiversity only has the possibility of remaining constant or declining. This seems to 
reflect the fact that, on the whole, natural evolution is extremely slow and that human 
actions have caused and continue to cause large reductions in existing biodiversity. 
Nevertheless, human actions have also ‘added’ genetic material to the natural stock by 
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 means of selective breeding and genetic engineering. Therefore, in assessing the 
genetic stock, we should take account of the pre-existing genetic stock that is lost (or 
anticipated to be lost), the existing genetic stock that is conserved, and additions to the 
genetic stock resulting from human efforts which we may designate respectively as 
sets A, B and C (compare Tisdell, 2005, p. 150; Tisdell, 2009b). Normally an increase 
in set C (man-made additions to the genetic stock) is, to some extent, at the expense of 
the pre-existing natural stock  
 
5.3. Human produced genotypes add some genetic possibilities but reduce 
others 
This raises an important issue: although loss of existing genetic material is usually 
believed to reduce options and therefore, have an economic cost, new human 
produced genotypes, such as genetically modified organisms (GMOs), open up new 
potentially valuable possibilities, add to knowledge and can enable further GMOs to 
be developed. Thus, if one continues with the library analogy, the library may become 
more valuable when its holdings are at capacity if it reduces its holdings to make way 
for publications containing new knowledge. Nevertheless, there is still a selection 
problem involving great uncertainty. Ex post, for instance, it may be found that some 
of the library materials discarded to make way for new material should have been 
retained. Furthermore, in some cases, their lost value may never be discovered. 
It can be argued that genetic engineering does not add to the available core genetic 
stock because it focuses on recombination of the existing genetic stock, albeit 
combinations that are unlikely to evolve naturally. If core genetic material is lost as a 
result of the introduction of GMOs (or as a consequence of other impacts of human 
activities), this limits the possibilities for future genetic engineering because it reduces 
the availability of basic genetic building blocks, given our current knowledge. Thus, 
the opening up of one set of options tends to reduce another set of options and 
complex economic comparisons are involved that have not yet been effectively 
addressed by economists.  
In many cases, it seems likely that GMOs will lose their ecological fitness at a faster 
rate than existing organisms for which they are substitutes. This is because GMOs are 
developed independently of natural environmental forces which over extraordinary 
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 long periods of time have shaped natural organisms. Similarly, human selected 
genotypes that have been in existence for a long period of time may sustain their 
ecological fitness for longer than GMOs. For example, while Bt genes added to crops 
may initially be effective controlling insect pests in crops, eventually the effectiveness 
of this genetic manipulation may decline as a result of natural selection that favours 
Bt-resistant insects. Nevertheless, Bt crops may remain effective against insect pests 
for longer than a substitute chemical pesticide to which insects also develop resistance. 
This observation raises further issues. Given that the ecological fitness of GMOs is of 
limited duration, to what extent is it important to conserve non-GMOs that are 
substitutable for these, albeit somewhat imperfect substitutes? 
 
5.4. A model of the benefit from a new GMO in comparison to an existing 
genetic substitute given that GMOs decline in their ecological fitness with 
the passage of time 
The problem can be considered theoretically by focusing on a simple case. Suppose 
that a GMO has been developed and that there is a single non-GMO that is a 
substitute for it. Envisage a situation where the flow of net benefit from use of the 
GMO as a function of time is indicated in Figure 1 by the relationship ABCF where tn 
is the horizon for the decision problem. Assume that the net benefits from the use of 
the substitute non-GMO are as shown by line DBE. Initially, net benefits from use of 
the GMO exceed that from utilizing the non-GMO but this relationship is not 
sustained. Benefits from the non-GMO display sustainability but not those from the 
GMO – the latter returns slip below those available from the use of the non-GMO 
after t1. 
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Figure 1:  An illustration of the proposition that it can be a wise precaution to 
conserve a non-GMO substitute for a GMO because the net benefits 
from a GMO are unlikely to be sustained whereas these from a non-
GMO are more sustainable. 
Figure 1 indicates that it would be optimal to use the GMO until t1 but then replace it 
by the non-GMO if it is available. However, its availability at t1 will depend on the 
conservation of a viable population of a non-GMO or, in the case of plants (and 
similar organisms), their storage in a seed bank or a similar facility and this will 
involve overhead cost. 
 
5.5. Implications of the simple model for the social optimality of conserving 
existing genotypes 
Several interesting implications can be derived from this simple case. If the aim is to 
maximize the sum of net benefits obtained in the planning period, it will be optimal to 
use the GMO even when it results in a loss of the non-GMO if the area of triangle 
ABD exceeds that of quadrilateral BCFE. If the choice is the adoption of the GMO at 
the expense of the survival of the non-GMO, choice of the GMO is more likely to be 
optimal, the higher is the discount rate, the shorter the planning horizon and the longer 
the period for which benefits from using the GMO exceed those which could have 
been obtained by using the non-GMO. 
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 Nevertheless, an intergenerational equity problem is posed by the above choice even 
if a zero discount rate is used. This is a similar problem to that observed by Dasgupta 
and Heal (1974). For example, the GMO may be a staple crop, such as rice or wheat. 
The displacement of non-GMO varieties by a GMO in such cases can cause economic 
hardship to future generations which might be avoided by conserving substitutable 
non-GMO varieties. Given the assumed decline in the ecological fitness of a new 
GMO with the passage of time, the irreversible loss of its existing genetic substitues 
could severely reduce the amount of food (or other products supplied by crops, such 
as textile fibres) available to future generations and may impoverish them. However, 
the conservation of existing genetic substitutes for the new GMO involves upfront 
costs or overhead costs. If conservation of the non-GMO substitutes for a GMO is an 
option, then the costs incurred in ensuring the conservation in the period 0 < t < t1 
need to be compared with the future benefits of doing this which if undiscounted, are 
equal to the area of the rectangle BGFE. Other things held constant, the discounted 
value of conserving the non-GMO is less likely to be positive the higher discount rate, 
the shorter is the planning period and the longer is the period for which returns from 
the GMO exceed returns possible by using the non-GMO. However, if the returns 
from the GMO eventually fall below those attainable from the non-GMO, a decision 
not to conserve the GMO imposes avoidable and possibly severe economic hardship 
on future generations. The absence of discounting does not remove the 
intergenerational equity issue. If a high weight is placed on sustaining the welfare of 
future generations, this will favour conservation of substitutable non-GMOs if a new 
GMO is introduced or will be a deterrent to its introduction of the GMO if the 
conservation of a substitutable GMO is costly or problematic. The extent to which 
precautions should be taken is influenced by the social economic objective to be 
pursued. 
5.6. Uncertainty of benefits from new GMOs favours conservation of their 
existing genetic substitutes. 
In the case illustrated in Figure 1, certainty of the path of returns from the alternative 
genotypes was assumed. However, many factors are likely to create uncertainties. For 
example, the rate at which the ecological fitness of the GMO declines is likely to be 
uncertain as well as its impacts on the genetic composition of other related organisms. 
This uncertainty is expected to be greater for GMOs than for substitute non-GMOs. 
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 The greater is the uncertainty of benefits from a new GMO (the greater is the possible 
range of net returns from the GMO), the less likely is the introduction of the GMO to 
be the optimal social choice, other things held constant. For example, this will be so if 
a minimax gain strategy is adopted. This is illustrated by the game matrix in Table 3 
where payoffs are shown in its body. In this case, there are two states of nature: 
namely, s1, the GMO proves to have a high future value or s2, the GMO turns out to 
have a low future value. Two possible strategies are considered: α1, introduce the 
GMO and eliminate the substitute non-GMO or α2, do not do this and retain the non-
GMO. As can be seen, the minimax strategy is not to introduce the GMO. However, 
in the example given, the minimax regret criterion favours the introduction of the 
GMO. A third strategy could be added, namely that of retaining a sufficient quantity 
of the germplasm of the non-GMO to enable it to be used in the future should the 
GMO lose its fitness or comparative economic value. This precaution eliminates 
irreversibility but its optimality depends on the cost and feasibility of conserving the 
GMO when the non-GMO is adopted. Nevertheless, there will be many circumstances 
where this precautionary measure is rational. It implies that, as a rule, the introduction 
of GMOs (and possibly most human improved species of organisms) increases the 
desirability of conserving their substitute genetypes. 
Table 4:  An illustration that uncertainty militates against the introduction of a 
GMO if it results in the loss of a substitute non-GMO 
  GMO of high 
future value 
GMO of little 
future value 
 
  s1 s2  
Introduce GMO α1 20 6 6 
Do not introduce GMO 
(non-GMO conserved) 
α2 10 10 10* 
 
Note that in the case illustrated in Table 1 application of the minimax criterion (risk 
aversion) was not favourable to the conservation of existing species or genotypes but 
the opposite is the case for the example given in Table 4. The rational precautionary 
measure depends on the structure of the problem, attitudes to the bearing risk and 
uncertainty and the nature of the aim pursued. For example, it was shown that 
application of the minimax regret criterion often results in different biodiversity 
choices to the minimax gain criterion and so on. 
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 The above theoretical argument that a rational precautionary measure when new 
GMOs are adopted is to conserve existing genetic substitutes for the new GMOs is 
based on the assumption that GMOs are likely to be wasting assets because they tend 
to lose their ecological fitness with the passage of time. However, new GMOs may 
provide stepping stones for the development of additional GMOs that are substitutes 
for earlier ones. This will tend to reduce the expected benefits from conserving 
existing genotypes. Nevertheless, because the further developments of GMOs are 
uncertain, it is still likely to be a wise precaution to conserve existing genotypes that 
are substitutes for new GMOs, especially if the cost of doing so is not high. 
6. Concluding Comments 
The precautionary principle has been viewed as an important element of 
environmental policy since the Rio Declaration of 1992 and is widely believed to be 
favourable to the conservation of existing natural environments and the current stock 
of biodiversity including measures to avoid deterioration in these. However, in most 
legal documents and international agreements the policy implications of the principle 
are imprecise. Consequently, this principle is not operational without making several 
additional assumptions. Furthermore, this article shows that conserving existing 
natural environments and existing biodiversity is not always a rational precautionary 
measure. Therefore, application of the principle does not always support pro-
conservation policies. 
It was demonstrated that the choice of a rational precautionary measure depends on a 
variety of factors such as objectives, attitudes to risk-bearing and the extent which it is 
rational or possible to be informed about the future. While risk-aversion may favour 
the conservation of existing genotypes, it does not always do this. The result is 
sensitive to the type of objective adopted, for example whether the guiding rule is to 
maximize expected benefit, obtain maximin gain or experience minimax regret. In 
some cases, the expected gain criterion is more favourable to the conservation of 
existing geotypes than the minimax gain criterion and conflicting conservation 
recommendations can emerge from application of the maximin gain and the minimax 
regret criteria. 
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 Particular attention was given to precautions that ought to be taken when considering 
the introduction of genetically engineered organisms or human selected genotypes. It 
was argued that while the introduction of such organisms often leads to the loss of 
existing biodiversity and reduces options for use of the existing genetic pool, it also 
opens up new genetic options and learning possibilities. This is frequently 
characteristic of human innovations. The possibility of one set of biodiversity options 
being replaced by another set does not seem to have been explored by specialists in 
biodiversity economics, such as Kontoleon et al. (2007) who report on the current 
state of the subject. It does, however, emerge from the above analysis that risk-
aversion about benefits from human engineered organisms tends to favour policies to 
conserve existing organisms that are substitutes for new human engineered organisms. 
An incidental result from the above analysis is that in assessing the flow of benefits 
from alternative development strategies, even the use of a zero discount rate, an 
approach suggested by Ramsey (1928), is inadequate in allowing for the consideration 
of intergenerational equity (compare Dasgupta and Heal, 1974). This is an additional 
complication to the lack of any regular connection between the level of the rate of 
interest and the conservation of the genetic stock (Tisdell, 2009c). 
A worrying feature of discussion of the precautionary principle has been the tendency 
of some individuals to load it with value judgments and to pre-empt its possible 
implications for environmental policy without considering the logical steps necessary 
for the conclusions assumed to follow. In most cases, their value judgments are not 
evident in relevant legal agreements and documents that mention the precautionary 
principle. For example, one view is that natural environments and existing 
biodiversity should be imbued with intrinsic values in view of the precautionary 
principle. This is a normative position that would affect the objective function but it is 
not an implication of precautionary motives as such. Again, the view that the 
precautionary principle implies that those wishing to change environments ought to 
prove that this change does no harm is not necessarily implied by the principle. This 
procedure may result, for instance, in excess precaution if the standard of proof is 
very high. 
Of course, ecocentrism might favour the conservation of existing genotypes. However, 
ecocentrism is not an element of the precautionary principle. Again the ‘status quo’ or 
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 endowment effect (Knetsch, 1990; Kahneman et al., 1991) will undoubtedly favour 
the conservation of existing genotypes. Whether such a behavioural bias is rational is 
unclear but it is a fact of life. 
What constitutes a rational precautionary measure is liable to vary with the 
circumstances involved and one should be wary about drawing hasty general 
conclusions about what precautionary measures are rational. This is highlighted by 
conflicting adages in English and presumably in other languages also. For example, 
the extent to which it is rational to collect information about future possibilities before 
acting varies with the circumstances. This is apparent from the following English 
adages: ‘He who hesitates is lost’ and ‘Look before you leap’. The applicability of this 
advice varies with the circumstances being encountered. 
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